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INTRODUCTION
In August 2009, a group of parents in California filed a lawsuit,
Balde v. Alameda Unified School District, in the Superior Court of Cali-
fornia, County of Alameda.' They alleged that the Alameda Unified
School District refused them the right to excuse their children from a
new curriculum, Lesson 9, that would teach public elementary school
children about gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (GLBT) families.
The proposed curriculum included short sessions about GLBT people,
incorporated into more general lessons about family and health, once a
year from kindergarten through fifth grade.' Kindergarteners would
learn the harms of teasing, while fifth graders would study sexual orien-
tation stereotypes.' One parent alleged that, although an overwhelming
majority of parents spoke out against CLBT instruction at numerous
school board meetings, the board chairman repeatedly told the public
that the curriculum was evenly supported and opposed. Parents suspect-
ed the board had a preconceived political agenda behind the proposal.'
Other parents expressed their full support for the proposed curriculum
because, noting that the school is a reflection of the community and the
world, children from a very early age should see what the world is like.'
The implementation of a gay-friendly curriculum in public schools
often leads to a conflict between the power of the state to oversee the
education of school children and the rights of parents to instill their
children with their own beliefs and values . Over the past decade, nu-
merous commentators have advocated introducing gay positive materials
1. Balde v. Alameda Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-468037 (Super. Ct. Cal. Alameda
County Dec. 1, 2009).
2. Angry Parents Suing Califrnia Schools Over Mandatory Gay-Frien-d Ctsses, Fox NEWS,
(Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,546280,00.html ?mep.
3. See Brief (Amended) of Petitioner-Plaintiffs at 5, 9-11, Balde v. Alameda Unified
Sch. Dist., No. 09-468037 (Super. Ct. Cal. Alameda Cnty. denied Dec. 1, 2009).
4. Katie Landan, Gay Curriculum Proposal Riles Elementary School Parents, Fox NEWS,
(May 22, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/striy/0,2933,521I209,o0.htmi.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 101-02 (1 st Cit. 2008).
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to school children! Arthur Lipkin, for instance, debunks the myth that
classrooms "have always been 'sexuality-free' and stresses that "they
have always been both sexualized and heterosexist." 9 Lipkin argues that a
gay-friendly curriculum would increase students' understanding of di-
versity and combat antigay bigotry,'" and a "complete, honest
curriculum is more powerful than a censored one.""' Lipkin concurs
with Kathy Bickmore that GLBT issues can be raised in the elementary
school curriculum, because "students in any classroom represent a range
of sexual knowledge and maturity that cannot be predicted by grade
level."'12 Nevertheless, parents' concern over the subtle influence of mate-
rial taught to their children is not unjustified. Not only do the values
and beliefs endorsed by these materials often conflict with their own,
but the impressionability of young children also makes them susceptible
to persuasion and confusion by conflicting messages from the adult
world.'"
The parents' petition for a writ of mandamus to require the school
district to excuse their children from Lesson 9 was denied by the Court
on December 1, 2009, '4 and the pleadings filed do not claim any viola-
tion of the children's rights under the Constitution."
This Article studies the constitutionality of Lesson 9 in California
public elementary schools. Parts 1 and 11 look at recent court decisions
on gay-friendly curricula to unravel potential Constitutional claims. Part
I looks at Parker v. Hurley to see why the First Circuit dismissed the
plaintiffs' First Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment due
process claims. It also criticizes a very recent law review article that attacks
the soundness of the First Circuit's holding. Part 11 studies Montgomey
County Public School v. Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum, to address
how a gay-friendly curriculum can still violate the First Amendment Es-
tablishment Clause and Free Speech Clause in some cases.
8. See, e.g., ARTHUR LIPKIN, BEYOND DIVERsiTY DAY: A Q & A ON GAY AND LESBIAN
ISSUES IN ScHools Games T. Sears ed., 2004).
9. See id. at 209.
10. 1d. at 195.
11. Id. at 195.
12. See id. at 220; Kathy Bickmore, Why Discuss Sexuality in Elementary School?, in
QUEERING ELEMENTARY EDUCATION 15, 15-25 (William J. Lents IV & James T.
Sears eds., 1999). These commentators attribute children's uninformed sexual inter-
ests and pleasures to a media that is saturated with explicitly sexual images and
messages.
13. See, eg., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
14. Balde v. Alameda Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-468037 (Super. Ct. Cal. Alameda Cnity.
Dec. 1, 2009) (order denying petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus).
15. Balde, No. 09-468037.
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Part III explores Lesson 9 in detail, including its course materials
and instructions to teachers, to see why it does not implicate the rights
of the plaintiffs or their children's rights under the First Amendment.
With regard to a potential due process claim, this part makes use of
Fields v. Palmdale School District, a Ninth Circuit case, to affirm the Par-
ker court's holding that parents do not have the right to control public
school curriculum or exempt children from it. Part III also cites to the
Ninth Circuit to introduce a rational basis test for a potential due pro-
cess claim, where parents do not concede that the disputed curriculum
satisfies any state purposes. In addition, the Ninth Circuit gave a broad-
er example of "legitimate state interest" than the First Circuit did by not
relying on California's current state law and instead stressing the "broad
ends of education" in serving "higher civic functions.",16 Under this
broad definition, Lesson 9 is constitutional both because it complies with
California's laws on marriage and education, and because California's
legalization of gay marriage for a brief period in 2008 and the district
court's subsequent overturning of Proposition 8 in 2010 created a legit-
imate educational objective in educating young children about married
gay couples who still reside in California.
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of the foregoing discus-
sion for implementing a gay-friendly curriculum in other states. It
argues that a curriculum like Lesson 9, which promotes "safery and toler-
ance" of GLBT people and alternative families, would be Constitutional
in all states. In states that do not permit same-sex marriage, certain sto-
rybooks that explicitly endorse same-sex marriage, not merely a
tolerance for diversity, might be deemed unrelated to any legitimate
state purposes, and hence the use of the books would be deemed uncon-
stitutional.
1. PARKER v. HURLEY THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S SOUND HOLDING
A. Due Process and Free Exercise Claims
In Parker v. Hurley, two sets of devout Judeo-Christian parents, the
Parkers and the Wirthlins, sued the School District in Lexington, Mas-
sachusetts, in which their young children were enrolled, for not giving
them prior notice and the opportunity to exempt their children from
exposure to gay-positive storybooks that they found repugnant in a reli-
16. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1209 (9th Cir. 2005).
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gious sense.17 While the Parkers objected to their child being presented
in kindergarten and first grade with Whos in a Family? and Mollys Fami-
ly, both portraying diverse families," the Wirthlins complained that
their son's second-grade teacher read to his class King and King, which
depicts and celebrates a gay marriage.' 9 They asserted violations of their
own and their children's First Amendment right to the free exercise of
religion and of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to paren-
tal autonomy in the upbringing of their children. In addition, they
claimed a violation of the Massachusetts parental notification ("opt
out") statute .2 0 The First Circuit found the use of the storybooks consti-
tutional and therefore affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claims.'
On the due process claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
interfered with their substantive due process right "to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children" and "system-
atically indoctrinated" their children with gay-positive ideas .2  On their
free exercise claims, the plaintiffs asserted that the important influence
teachers have on young children undercuts the plaintiffs' ability to influ-
ence their children toward the familys religious views, particularly since
the parents "were given no notice that such curricular materials were in
use."23 The parents also feared that the curriculum forced their children
to affirm beliefs "inconsistent with and prohibited by their religion.
2
1
The plaintiffs argued that their request for notice and exemption from
the curriculum was a logical extension of their parental rights to direct
the upbringing of their children, "as reinforced by their free exercise
rights.",2 ' They further argued that they had pled a "hybrid claim," one
involving free exercise claims brought in conjunction with other claims
of violations of constitutional protections; this "hybrid claim" entitled
them to strict scrutiny review, which required the defendants to demon-
strate a compelling state interest in the choice of the storybooks .
In its opinion, the Parker court referred to the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court's recognition of same-sex marriage in Goodria'ge v.
17. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1St Cir. 2008).
18. Parker, 514 F.3d at 92-93.
19. Parker, 514 F.3d at 93.
20. Parker, 514 F.3d at 90.
21. Parker, 514 F.3d at 107.
22. Parker, 514 F.3d ar 93, 10 1.
23. Parker, 514 F.3d at 94.
24. Parker, 514 F.3d at 94.
25. Parker, 514 F.3d at 102.
26. Parker, 514 F.3d at 98.
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Department of Public Health on November 18, 2003.7 The court also
described the state's comprehensive education reform bill, enacted in
1993, that requires the "State Board of Education (SBE) to establish
academic standards for core subjects . .. designed to include respect for
the cultural, ethnic and racial diversity of the commonwealth . .. to
avoid perpetuating gender, cultural, ethnic or racial stereotypes. 2 ' The
Comprehensive Health Curriculum Framework, set up by the SBE in
1999, consists of different goals and measurements, called "strands."
Under the Social and Emotional Health Strand are a Family Life com-
ponent and an Interpersonal Relationships component: the former states
that elementary school children should be able to "[d]escribe different
types of families"; the latter recommends that children from pre-
kindergarten through grade five be able to "[d]escribe the concepts of
prejudice and discrimination."" In grades six to eight, the Interpersonal
Relationships component addresses "the detrimental effect of prejudice
(such as prejudice on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, class,
or religion) on individual relationships and society as a whole.""0 In ad-
dition, the Physical Health Strand contains a Reproduction/Sexuality
component providing that by grade five, students should be able to
"1[dlefine sexual orientation using the correct terminology (such as het-
erosexual, and gay and lesbian)."3'
The First Circuit then considered the plaintiffs' due process and
free exercise claims interdependently, given that those two sets of inter-
ests informed one another. Without subjecting the curriculum to any
applicable standard of review, the court confirmed the district court's
dismissal of the two claims."2
27. Parker. 514 F.3d at 92 (citing Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003)).
28. Parker, 514 F.3d at 91 (quoting MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 69, § I D (Lexis~exis 1993)).
29. Parker, 514 F.3d at 91.
30. Parker, 514 F.3d at 91 (quoting MASS. DEP'T. OF EDUC., MASS. COMPREHENSIVE
HEALTH CURRICULUM FRAMEWORK (1999)).
31. Parker, 514 F.3d at 91 (quoting MASS. DEPT. OF EDUC., MASS. COMPREHENSFVE
HEALTH CURRICULUM FRAMEWORK (1999)).
32. Parker, 514 F.3d at 87. The First Circuit noted that, since courts have disagreed on
what makes a "hybrid claim" and how strong the companion claim must be to estab-
lish a "hybrid" situation with the Free Exercise claim, the plaintiffs' claim might or
might not belong to the category of "hybrid situations." Parker, 514 F.3d at 97.
Nonetheless, it noted that, whether the plaintiffs had raised a "hybrid claim" was not
dispositive of the case, because no published circuit court opinion had ever subjected
such a claim to strict scrutiny review. Parker, 514 F.3d at 98.
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B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim
The First Circuit narrowly defined the parents' due process rights
with regard to their children's education .3 ' Given the parents' concession
that Massachusetts legitimately used a gay-positive curriculum, the court
held that the defendants had not violated the parents' due process rights,
without even addressing the applicable standard of review."4 It acknowl-
edged that the plaintiffs were correct that the Supreme Court recognized
a "substantive due process right of parents 'to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of their children,' which may be consid-
ered a subset of a broader substantive due process right of familial
privacy."3" Nevertheless, the First Circuit cited Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub-
lic School District, a Supreme Court decision, for the proposition that
"while parents can choose between public and private schools, they do
not have a constitutional right to 'direct how public schools teach their
children.' ,136 The court relied upon Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Socie-
ty of Sisters, two other Supreme Court decisions, to support its holding
that parental rights should not interfere with "'the state's power to pre-
scribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports.' "07 In addition,
there was "no federal case under the Due Process Clause which [had]
permitted parents to demand an exemption for their children from ex-
posure to certain books used in public schools."3  Therefore, the Due
Process Clause, either in its parental control or its privacy focus, did not
give the plaintiffs the degree of control over their children's education
that they sought."9
C First Amendment Free Exercise Claim
The First Circuit, having decided that the parents did not have a
Due Process Right to control their children's curriculum, further ex-
plained why the combination of substantive due process and free
33. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 10 1-03.
34. See Parker, 514 F.3d at101-03.
35. Parker, 514 F.3d at 101-02 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000)
(plurality opinion)).
36. Parker, 514 F.3d at 102 (quoting Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d
381, 395 (6th Cit. 2005)).
37. Parker, 514 F.3d at 102 (quoting Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); citing
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)).
38. Parker, 514 F.3d at 102.
39. Parker, 514 F.3d at 102-03.
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exercise interests did not give the plaintiffs a cause of action.4 0 Given
that the free exercise of religion means "the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires,' the "government may not, for
example, (1) compel affirmation of religious beliefs; (2) punish the ex-
pression of religious doctrines it believes to be false; (3) impose special
disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status; or (4) lend
its power to one side or the other in controversies over religious authori-
ties or dogma.",4 ' Because the Free Exercise Clause is not a general
protection of religion or religious belief, but has a more limited reach of
protecting the free exercise of religion, it is written in terms of what the
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the indi-
vidual can exact from the government. To prevail on a free exercise
claim, it would be necessary for the plaintiffs to show the coercive effect
of the curriculum as it operated against them in the practice of their re-
ligion.4
1. Coercion/Compulsion Versus Indoctrination
In holding that the defendants did not violate the plaintiffs' free ex-
ercise rights, the First Circuit relied heavily upon Mozert v. Hawkins
County Board of Education, which was factually similar to Parker, to ex-
plain the disposirive significance of "compulsion/coercion" in a free
exercise claim .4 In Mozert, the Sixth Circuit held that "exposure to [al-
legedly offensive ideas] through required reading did not constitute a
constitutionally significant burden on the plaintiffs' free exercise of reli-
gion."" The Free Exercise Clause prohibits "governmental compulsion
either to do or refrain from doing an act forbidden or required, respec-
tively, by one's religion, or to affirm or disavow a belief forbidden or
required, respectively, by one's religion."" Because the plaintiffs in Par-
ker, like those in A'ozert, did not "allege coercion in the form of a direct
interference with their religious beliefs, nor of compulsion in the form
of punishment for their beliefs," their free exercise rights were not vio-
lated.4"
40. Parker, 514 F.3d at 103.
41. Parker, 514 F.3d at 103 (quoting Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)).
42. Parker, 514 F.3d at 103.
43. See Parker, 5 14 F.3d at 105.
44. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105 (citing Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d
1058, 1065 (6th Cir. 1987)).
45. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105 (quoting Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069).
46. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
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The First Circuit then distinguished "coercion" from "indoctrina-
tion" and asserted that the plaintiffs' claim is essentially a claim of
"indoctrination," namely, that the "state strongly encouraged their chil-
dren to endorse an affirmative view of gay marriage and thus unidercut
their efforts to inculcate their children with their opposing religious
views."4" The court relied upon West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette in noting that the Supreme Court had never utilized an indoc-
trination test under the Free Exercise Clause."S The Barnette Court "held
that the state could not coerce acquiescence through compelled state-
ments of belief, such as the mandatory recital of the pledge of allegiance
in public schools"; nevertheless, it did not say that "the state could not
attempt to instill values in school children by instruction," which it
carefully distinguished from coercion. 9
2. A Continuum of Influence
The First Circuit instead conceived "indoctrination" as a continu-
um and decided that the use of the storybooks as falling short of
extreme indoctrination" and was therefore constitutional. 0 It rejected
the plaintiffs' indoctrination argument by refusing to address whether or
not an indoctrination theory under the Free Exercise Clause is sound."'
In doing so, the court explained why the plaintiffs' pleadings did not
establish a viable case of indoctrination, even assuming that "extreme
indoctrination" can be a form of coercion .5  First, that the plaintiffs'
children were merely exposed on occasion in public schools to allegedly
offensive ideas would not stop them from instructing their children as
they saw fit.5" Since the parents had notice of the books and of the
school's overall intent to promote tolerance of same-sex marriage, they
retained their ability to discuss the material and subject matter with
their children. 4 In the case of the Parkers, since the two books were
merely found in the bag and not read to him, his free exercise rights
were not violated.5 5 As for the Wirthlins' child, even assuming that the
47. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
48. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
49. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
631, 634, 640, 642 (1943)).
50. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
51. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
52. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
53. Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
54. Parker, 514 F.3d at 106.
55. Parker, 514 F.3d at 106.
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defendants intended to use the reading of King and King to influence
him and that there is a continuum along which an intent to influence
could become an attempt to indoctrinate, the defendants' intent could
only be to influence the child toward tolerance.516 Because evidence of
"csystemic indoctrination" was lacking, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs'
free exercise claim.5
D. Rebutting Russo's "Uneven Approach" Criticism
Charles J. Russo published an article expressing what, at first
glance, appear to be legitimate concerns regarding Parker's holding."8
First, he is highly skeptical of the First Circuit's opinion that the defend-
ants did not indoctrinate the plaintiffs' children with ideas about gay
marriage.59 By criticizing the First Circuit for failing to address ade-
quately the "undue influence" of educators in "shaping the minds of
children," and what he deems the "uneven approach" undertaken by
courts "with respect to what students can be exposed to in school set-
tings," he suggests that plaintiffs had a viable indoctrination claim. 6
Russo directs his second criticism against the First Circuit's ac-
knowledgment of age as a factor in Free Exercise Clause cases and its
failure to directly resolve this issue for the rest of its opinion .6 He argues
that the plaintiffs' children might likely have "experienced confusion
when they were exposed to ideas ... that they could not fully compre-
hend either because the materials differed from values espoused in their
homes or were beyond their developmental needs or abilities.
62
Russo refers to Lee v. Weisman 63 and Roberts v. Madigan6' to "criti-
cize the uneven . .. approach by courts toward what educators may or
may not teach children .6 His references are legitimate: while both
Weisman and Roberts are Establishment Clause cases, the courts' hold-
ings relied significantly upon their definitions of "coercion" and
"indoctrination," which is the heart of the First Circuit's holding in Par-
56. Parker, 514 F.3d at 106.
57. Parker, 514 F.3d at 106.
58. See Charles J. Russo, "The Child is Not the Mere Creature of the Stae'- Controversy
.Over Teaching About Same-Sex Marriage in Public Schools, 232 EDUC. L. REP'. 1, 13-
14 (2008) [hereinafter Russo].
59. See id.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 12.
62. Id. atl12.
63. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
64. 921 F.2d 1047 (l0th Cir. 1990).
65. See id at 13-14.
Vol. 17:315324
ker 66 Weisman is a Supreme Court decision that prohibires a rabbi from
conducting a prayer at a public school graduation ceremony on the
grounds that the prayer could have resulted in the psychological coer-
cion of students who were required to participate in the ceremony, and
therefore coerced to participate in the prayer.617 Roberts is a Tenth Circuit
decision that prohibits a fifth-grade schoolteacher from proselytizing to
his students with Christianity." Russo argues that the First Circuit could
not justifiably treat school officials in Parker as being any less capable of
shaping the attitudes of students than were the school officials in these
two cases. 69However, Russo's arguments are incorrect, based upon high-
ly cursory analyses of these two cases .7  Upon closer reading, the facts of
these decisions were different than those in Parker, and such differences
allow for differing conclusions about whether the plaintiffs were indoc-
trinated or coerced.
Russo does not mention the Weisman court's "delicate and fact-
sensitive" inquiry that identified multiple factors contributing to the
coercive nature of the rabbi's prayer. By this significant omission, he ob-
scures how Weisman is different from Parker .7 ' First, according to the
Weisman Court, the pressure that the teachers, principals and friends
imposed upon students to attend the ceremony could be as real as overt
coercion; 7 2 second, the graduation ceremony is "one of life's most signifi-
cant occasions, 7 1 third, the srtudents had to maintain "respecrfiul silence"
during the ceremony; and fourth, they were likely to view their stand-
ing and remaining silent as participating in the prayer, rather than just
respect for the act .7 ' The Weisman court's determination was based on
these specific facts, none of which are present in Parker.
The differences between Weisman and Parker are clear. The plain-
tiffs in Parker did not allege that the school officials imposed pressure
upon their children.7 The Parkers' child was merely in the presence of a
66. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 103, 105-06 (lst.Cir. 2008).
67. Russo, supra note 58, at 13; see Charles J. Russo, Same-sex Marriage and Public School
Curricular Preserving Parental Rights to Direct the Education of their Children, 32 U.
DAYTON L. Ruv. 361, 372 (2007). Russo's 2007 article obviously came before Par-
ker's holding, although the author addresses more generally his concern regarding the
possible indoctrination of public school students by a gay-friendly curriculum.
68. Russo, supra note 58, at 13-14.
69. Id. at 14.
70. See, eg, id. at 13-14.
71. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593, 595; Russo, supra note 58, at 13.
72. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593.
73. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 595.
74. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593.
75. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 593.
76. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 105 (1st Cit. 2008).
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bag and a library, both containing the allegedly offensive books."7 Russo
would argue that the Wirthlins' child was obligated to attend the class in
which his teacher read King and King to him."8 Yet, unlike in a gradua-
tion ceremony, not only was there no acquiescence to a "group ritual" in
a class, but there was also no allegation that the child could not protest
or criticize the story.7 In fact, the Wirthlins' child did protest and criti-
cize. While the Wirthlins did not allege what their child did or did not
do in class, they did allege that on the same day, the child freely and
readily protested to his parents, calling the story "so silly."80 Thus, there
was no coercion in Parker.
Russo likewise provides a cursory analysis of Roberts, which leaves
out crucial facts and obscures the significant differences between Roberts
and Parker, in that there was no indoctrination in Parker. In this Tenth
Circuit case, the fifth-grade school teacher devoted fifteen minutes each
day to a "silent reading period," during which students were allowed to
choose their own reading materials, or materials from his classroom li-
brary which contained, among others, two Christian religious books.8 '
Purportedly to set an example for his students, the teacher silently read
his own materials during the reading time and frequently chose the Bi-
ble, which he kept on his desk throughout the school day. He also
displayed a poster in his classroom that read, "You have only to open
your eyes to see the hand of God."8" Maintaining the "difference be-
tween teaching about religion, which is acceptable, and teaching
religion, which is not,"8" the Tenth Circuit found that his actions, when
viewed in their entirety, communicated a Christian message to his
class .8 ' The trial court also argued that the danger of indoctrinating stu-
dents with religious beliefs is much greater in a classroom than in a
library. 8 1 "Attendance [was] compulsory in the classroom," where the
defendant stood "in a position of power as the disciplinarian, role model
and educator," and students became a "captive audience vulnerable to
even silent forms of religious indoctrination."" The Tenth Circuit did
77. Parker, 514 F.3d at 92-93
78. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 93.
79. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 93, 105.
80. Parker, 514 F.3d at 93.
81. Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1049 (10th Cit. 1990).
82. Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1049.
83. Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1055.
84. Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1057 (citing Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505, 1517 (D.
Colo. 1989)).
85. See Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1055.
86. Roberts, 702 F. Supp. at 1513.
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not dispute this point. 7 Such differences become significant as they help
to differentiate between Roberts and Parker.
The differences between Roberts and Parker are obvious. The
Parkers' child, who was only provided some books, was not subjected to
an oppressive classroom environment conducive to indoctrination."
Russo would argue that the Wirthlins' child, being read the offensive
book in the classroom, was forced into a situation similar to the students
in Roberts.89 Nevertheless, he was read the book only once and was not
subjected to continuous exposure as were the Roberts students to the
Bible.9 0 Most significantly, the teacher did not display in the classroom
any posters, let alone one that explicitly endorses a religion."1 The teach-
er in Parker was, at most, teaching about gay marriage, which is ac-
acceptable in Massachusetts, but not teaching gay marriage, which, like
teaching religion, is indoctrination and therefore unacceptable."2
E. Rebutting Russo's 'Age" Criticism
Russo criticizes the First Circuit for mentioning the ages of the
children, thus acknowledging age as a factor in Free Exercise Clause cas-
es but failing to deal with this factor for the rest of its opinion."3 He
asserts that young children are most susceptible to confusion when they
are exposed to materials that discuss intimate issues without parental
consent or input.9 " He accuses the First Circuit of blithely ignoring how
school officials might have manipulated the situation in order to pursue
pro-gay state propaganda.9" Russo's criticism is nonetheless dubious for
two reasons.
First, it was not really necessary for the First Circuit to address the
age factor, because the gay-friendly curriculum in Parker strictly com-
plied with the state law of Massachusetts .9  As already discussed, the
Family Life component under the Social and Emotional Health Strand
of the Comprehensive Health Curriculum Framework states that ele-
mentary school children should be able to "[djescribe different types of
87. See Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1055.
88. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 92-93 (1 st Cir. 2008).
89. See Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1055.
90. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 93.
91. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 93.
92. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 93; Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1055.
93. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 101; Russo, suprTa note 58, at 12.
94. Russo, supra note 58, at 12.
95. Id. at 12-13.
96. See Parker, 514 F.3d at9 1.
CALIFORNIA'S LESSON 9 32720111
328 ~MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW [o.1:1
families,"1 whereas its Interpersonal Relationships component recom-
mends that children from pre-kindergarten through grade five be able to
"(I diescribe the concepts of prejudice and discrimination.0 7 Accordingly,
teachers and school officials acted within the scope of their power to
introduce Whos in a Family? and Mollys Family, both portraying diverse
families, to kindergarteners and grade-one students.98 Likewise, to fur-
ther the state objectives of helping students learn about diverse families
and of combating discrimination, introducing King and King to
second-grade students was by no means premature.9
Second, the First Circuit's opinion that the defendants used the sto-
rybooks to teach students about "tolerance" also made it unnecessary to
address the age factor, because "tolerance" is an attitude that can be
learned by young children. 09 While Chamberlain v. Surrey School District
No. 36, a Canadian case, has no precedential force on Parker, its com-
ment regarding age and tolerance can serve to address what might seem
like an inadequacy in the First Circuit's opinion.'O In Chamberlain, the
school board of Surrey District in British Columbia of Canada refused
to permit an elementary school teacher to teach three books that
approvingly described same-sex parenting in his kindergarten and grade-
one classes.'02 The Supreme Court of Canada, addressing the concern
that students would receive conflicting messages at home and get con-
fused, held that this kind of "cognitive dissonance" "is simply a part of
living in a diverse society It is also part of growing up."' The Court
added that, if the message of the three books at issue was one of respect-
ful tolerance, then "tolerance is always ageaprrit."0
11. Montgomery County Public Schools:
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND FREE SPEECH VIOLATIONS
Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery County Public
Schools, a Maryland case, helps to unravel further the potential issues
raised by a gay-positive curriculum. The Montgomery County Public
97. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 91.
98. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 91.
99. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 91.
100. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 106.
101. Chamberlain v. Surrey Scb. Dist. No. 36, [2003] 221 D.L.R. 4th 56, para. 67-69
(Can.).
102. Chamberlain, 221 D.L.R. 4th 56, para. I (Can.).
103. Chamberlain, 221 D.L.R. 4th para. 65; David Schneiderman, Canada: Supreme Court
Addresses Gay-Positive Readers in Public Schools, 3 INTw'i J. CONST.- L. 77, 80 (2005).
104. Chamberlain, 221 D.L.R. 4th para. 69.
328 Vol. 17:315
Schools Board implemented a curriculum (the "Revised Curriculum")
that discusses sexual orientation and sexual identity among grade-eight
to grade-ten students in its public schools.'05 The plaintiffs, including a
non-profit organization formed by students and parents to oppose the
curriculum, filed for a temporary restraining order against the defend-
ants.10 6 Unlike the Parker Court, the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland found that the curriculum posed an imminent
threat to the plaintiffs' liberties under the First Amendment Establish-
ment Clause and the Free Speech Clause.'0 7
The Revised Curriculum described various terms, including "heter-
osexual," "homosexual," "lesbian," "bisexual," "transgendered," and
"1coming out, " with a content outline explaining that "[t]he definitions
are to be presented to students as stated below-no additional infor-
mation, interpretation or examples are to be provided by the teacher."' 8
The Grade Eight Revised Curriculum contained a "Myths and Facts"
worksheet, which asked students to answer whether a given statement
was true or false and then provided them with the answer.'0 9 One of the
Myths stated: "Loving people of the same sex is immoral (sinful)," and
its Fact then clarified that "many religious denominations" do not be-
lieve this, citing the Anglican Church of Canada as an example."0 In its
"Myths and Facts" handout, a Myth stated: "Homosexuality is a sin,"
and the Fact emphasized how "[rleligion has often been misused to jus-
tify hatred and oppression ."".. It then picked out Baptist Churches as an
example, stating how, "[less than half a century ago," they "defended
racial segregation on the basis that it was condoned by the Bible.""12 The
Fact further contrasted Baptist Churches with other religious institu-
tions: "Fortunately, many within organized religions are beginning to
105. Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., No. 05-
1194, 2005 \VL 1075634, at *2-5 (D. Md. May 5, 2005).
106. Montgomery Cny. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *5.
107. Besides the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech claims, the plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due
Process, Maryland Constitution Art. 24 Due Process, and a claim of ultra vires
against the defendants. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sc/s., 2005 WL 1075634, at *5. Be-
cause each claim, if successful, was individually sufficient to prevent the defendants
from going forward with the curriculum, the court only evaluated those First
Amendment claims at the heart of this case. Montgomery Cny. Pub. Sch., 2005 Wl,
1075634, at *9.
108. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sc/s., 2005 Wi. 1075634, at *2.
109. Montgomery Cnry. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *2.
110. See Montgomery Cniy. Pub. Sc/s., 2005 WL 1075634, at '3.
Ill. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. 5th., 2005 WL 1075634, at *4.
112. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sc/s., 2005 WL 1075634, at 4
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address the homophobia of the church" and "support full civil rights for
gay men and lesbians, as they do for everyone else."'
A. First Amendment Establishment Clause Claim
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
..'Ii14 and it serves to protect the integrity of both churches and the
state by keeping the two at arm's length."' There are several alleged rea-
sons for the application of free exercise limitations in schools. The
preservation of the community from divisive conflicts, of government
from irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, and of religion from
censorship and coercion (however subtly exercised), requires strict con-
finement of the state to non-religious instruction." 6 Hence, the public
school must be scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of
sects."17 The Court in Montgomery County Public Schools cited to the
three-part test used by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman"" to
decide whether a statute or state initiative violates the Establishment
Clause. "To pass muster under the Lemon test: (1) the government's ac-
tion must have a secular purpose; (2) the principal and primary effect of
the government's action must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (3) the government's action must not foster an "excessive
government entanglement with religion."' '19
The Court subjected the allegation that the Revised Curriculum
violated the Establishment Clause to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court
had held that, since religious freedom is a fundamental right, laws that
discriminate among religions and that do not pass the Lemon test are
subject to strict scrutiny review and must be narrowly tailored to satisfy
a compelling government interest. 20 The Revised Curriculum failed the
Lemon test, as it discriminated between religious sects by preferring
those sects that are friendly to the homosexual lifestyle and by portray-
113. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *4.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
115. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *8.
116. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *8.
117. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *8.
118. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
119. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 'XI 1075634, at *10 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
120. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); Montgomery Cney. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL
1075634, at *10.
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ing Baptist Churches as unenlightened and biblically misguided.' 2 ' The
court was skeptical that the Revised Curriculum, which unnecessarily
offered opinions on controversial topics in providing health-related in-
formation, was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.1
2 2
B. First Amendment Free Speech C/aim
The First Amendment of the Constitution declares that "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."'2 2' The teacher's
delivery of curriculum in a public school classroom is government
speech that occurs in a non-public forum.' Thus the government may
regulate the content of this speech as long as such regulations are (1)
reasonable and (2) viewpoint neutral. 2 1 Viewpoint discrimination, con-
sisting of state action in which "there is no ban on a general subject
matter, but only on one or more prohibited perspectives," is a blatant
form of First Amendment violation.1
2
1
The court in Montgomery County Public Schools held that the de-
fendants violated the Free Speech Clause because they opened up the
classroom to the subject of homosexuality and, furthermore, claimed
that the homosexual lifestyle is morally right; nevertheless, defendants
presented only one view on the subject, which is the naturalness and
moral correctness of such a lifestyle, to the exclusion of different per-
spectives. 17Moreover, the court was concerned that the Revised
Curriculum's advice that information concerning homosexuality is to be
presented to students as facts and that "no additional information, in-
terpretation or examples are to be provided by the teacher," would
violate the plaintiffs' free speech rights.1
2 8
121. Montgomery Cnry. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at 4,*10-11.
122. Montgomery Cnry. Pub. Sch., 2005 W L 1075634, at *11.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
124. Montgomery Cnry. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *11.
125. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *I1I (citing Warren v. Fairfax
Cnty., 988 F. Supp. 957, 962 (E.D. Va. 1997)).
126. Montgomery Cniy. Pub. Sch., 2005 \VL 1075634, at *12 (citing Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)).
127. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *12.
128. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *12.
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C, The Irrelevance ofMaryland Laws to MCPS Ho/ding
The Maryland court did not address the relevance of its laws on
marriage and education to its holding, let alone describe these two issues
in detail as did the Parker Court, when it expressed skepticism that the
Revised Curriculum was narrowly tailored to any compelling state inter-
est. 11Interestingly, the Court mentioned that, prior to the Revised
Curriculum, the School District had the policy of not discussing homo-
sexuality within its health education curriculum, and, if a student asked
a question regarding sexual orientation, the staff had to respond in "only
a perfunctory manner."30 To understand why the court held that the
curriculum posed an imminent threat to the plaintiffs' liberties under
the First Amendment Establishment and Free Speech Clauses, it is nec-
essary to look at Maryland's laws on marriage and education.
Same-sex marriage is prohibited in Maryland, and the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Conaway v. Deane rejected a challenge to Mary-
land' s 1973 statute that defines marriage as "a union of a man and a
woman."'13 1 Moreover, neither civil union nor domestic partnership is
legally recognized.132 Maryland's education codes do not mandate the
discussion of sexual orientation, prejudice or discrimination. 'While one
of the sub-goals under its Comprehensive Health Education Program is to
"[e]xamine differences in family structures, customs, and values," there
is no mention of whether the family structures include co-habiting rela-
tionships of same-sex couples.133 Such non-specificity applies to the
Family Life and Human Sexuality Standard of the Maryland Health Ed-
ucation Voluntary State Curriculum.3 3' This standard stipulates that
kindergarten students learn to define a family unit, and students from
grade one to three identify what is special about their families and what
makes a healthy family.' Fifth and sixth graders study puberty, the re-
productive process, and gender stereotypes, while eighth graders study
129. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *11.
130. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sc/i., 2005 WL 1075634, at * 1.
131. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007).
132. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALiTY, GENDER, AND THE LAW
136 (Thomson Reuters/ Fo undatio n Press 2d ed. Supp. 2009).
133. See Maryland Office of the Secretary of State, Maryland Comprehensive Health Education
Program, http://www.dsd.state.md~us/comar/comarhtmlll3a/13a.04.1I8.02.htm.
134. See Maryland State Department of Education, Comprehensive Health Education,
http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE/divisions/instruction/CompHeal.htm
?WBCMODE present% 2 5%3E%25%25%25.




teen pregnancy and methods of contraception. 3 6 High school students
continue to learn about puberty, reproduction, sexuality and culture.1
37
Given that Maryland does not allow same-sex marriage and does not
recognize any form of same-sex relationship, and that matters like sexual
orientation and stereotypes are absent throughout its health education
program, the "family" concept probably does not encompass diverse and
alternative families. Thus, it would be reasonable to infer that the school
district merely followed its state's laws on marriage and education by
adopting a policy not to discuss sexual orientation and sexual identity
prior to the Revised Curriculum.
38
Because Maryland law prohibits gay marriage, civil union and do-
mestic partnership, and matters like sexual orientation and sexual
identity are absent from its school program, the court was rightly skepti-
cal that the Revised Curriculum was tailored to any compelling state
interest under strict scrutiny review.' However, the court would have
rendered the same ruling upon the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause
claim regardless of the state's laws on marriage and education. Even if
Maryland, like Massachusetts, had recognized same-sex marriage and
had an education reform statute that mandated the teaching of diverse
families, the Revised Curriculum's attack of Baptist churches could not
have served any compelling government interest and therefore would
not have survived strict scrutiny review.1
4 0
This Article now turns to Lesson 9, the proposed curriculum in Cal-
ifornia, and explains why it is constitutional. Through a detailed
discussion of its course materials, teaching instructions and classroom
activities, this section argues that Lesson 9 does not violate any of the
First Amendment Clauses discussed. It then supplements Parker's opin-
ion on the due process claim with Fields v. Palmdale School District, a
Ninth Circuit opinion, which subjected the disputed material to a ra-
tional basis test and defined "legitimate state interest" in a broader way
than did the Parker court. By conrextualizing Lesson 9 in California's
unique history of gay marriage and its law on education, this section
136. School Improvement In Maryland, Voluntary State Curriculum-Health Education:
Grades 3-8, http://www.mdk12.org/instruction/curriculum/health/vsc health_
grprek3.pdf.
137. School Improvement In Maryland, Voluntary State Curriculum-Health Education: High
School, http://www.mdkl 2.org/instructionlcurriculum/healdi/vsc- health-grprek3.pdf.
138. See Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., No. 05-
1194, 2005 WL 1075634, at -1 (D. Md. May 5, 2005); ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra
note 132, at 136.
139. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *11; ESKRIDGE & HUNTER,
supra note 132, at 136.
140. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *4.
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argues that this new curriculum passes the rational basis test by fulfilling
official educational objectives of the state. Even including mote contro-
versial story books like King and King, which endorse same-sex marriage,
will not make Lesson 9 unconstitutional, as such materials will help to
fulfill both California's official educational objectives as well as its "high-
er civil function" to help students learn and adapt to their society.
111. CALIFORNIA'S LESSON 9: A POTENTIAL LAWSUIT
On May 26, 2009, the Alameda Unified School District Board of
Education adopted the Safe School Community Curriculum-Lesson 9,
also known as the Caring School Community Supplement, Lesson 9, for
the 2009-2010 school year to teach safety and tolerance in the class-
room. 4 1 While the Grades K-2 portion of the Lesson 9 curriculum
begins with instructions on how to teach students to make others feel
welcome in a new school, the Grades K-3 portion moves on to a discus-
sion about what constitutes a family 42 Its stated objectives are for
students to be able to (1) "identify what makes a family"; (2) "identify
and describe a variety of families" and (3) "understand that families have
some similarities and some differences."' In grades one to three, stu-
dents are asked to "discuss different family structures inclusive of gay
and lesbian parents," and to "identify the shared attributes of healthy
families."'14
A. What Is Lesson 9?
Although Lesson A~ initial proposal introduced students to Whos in
a Family? in kindergarten, its revised proposal includes the book in the
first grade lesson.' During a single-class period, teachers read this book
to students and ask them to describe a family." Teachers are instructed
that, if some students describe a family as having a mother, a father and
two children, they can acknowledge that some families look like this,
but they should also ask for other examples of what a family can look
like, so as to teach the students that "every person gets to decide who
141. Brief for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 3-4.
142. Id. at 4 .
143. Id. at 16.
144. Id. at 8-10.
145. Brief (Amended) for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 5-6 (Exhibit 1); Brief for
Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 65-66 (Exhibit 1).
146. Brief (Amended) for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 5-6 (Exhibit 1).
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their family is.""' 7 In the grade two lesson, which lasts for forty-five
minutes, students read And Tango Makes Three, a book about two male
penguins, who "fall in love and with the help of their keeper become
fathers to Tango (another male penguin).""' 8 By asking students to draw
two pictures, one of the penguin couple and one of their own families,
teachers help students identify alternative types of family structures."
Students also learn new vocabulary, including "caretaker" and "couple,"
and the message that "what is most important in a family is nor who
makes up the family but how the family cares for and loves each other
just like Roy and Silo's family." 50 The third grade lesson, entitled "Talk-
ing about Families," contains four thirty-minute segments, from which
students learn that "respect and tolerance for every type of family is im-
portant and expected."'"' After showing a film called Thats a Family,
teachers give each student a "Family Chart" and ask them individually
or in pairs to describe each family by the vocabulary introduced by the
teacher or the film, including "adoptive parents," "adopted children,"
two moms," and "two dads."11
2
The fourth grade lesson, "Developing Empathy and Being an Ally,"
contains two thirty- to forty-minute sessions." Teachers ask students to
read a schoolboy's article about bullying and discrimination to help
them "identify ways in which name-calling is hurtful," and "learn the
importance of being an ally in order to interrupt or stop name-
calling."' 4 The fifth grade lesson, "Discussing Stereotypes, including
LGBT," has two forty-minute sessions, and aims to "increase their
awareness of all stereotypes, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and
rransgender people."' Through describing a list of famous GLBT peo-
ple, teachers help students learn that these people "have made important
contributions within [the] U.S. and beyond," and that "a stereotype can
not only be inaccurate but can be hurtful and unkind."11
6
147. Id. at 7 (Exhibit 1).
148. Id. at 9-10 (Exhibit 1); Brief for Petitioners- Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 68 (Exhibit 1).
149. Brief (Amended) for Petitioners- Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 9 (Exhibit 1).
150. Id. at 9, 12 (Exhibit 1).
151. Id. at 13 (Exhibit 1).
152. Id. at 14 (Exhibit 1).
153. Id. at 17 (Exhibit 1).
154. Id
155. Id. at 23 (Exhibit 1).
156. Id. at 25-29 (Exhibit 1).
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B. What Are the Potential Claims?
The plaintiffs in Balde v. Alameda Unified School District claimed
that their religious and moral beliefs were inconsistent with the curricu-
lum's instructions on the characteristics of families."' 7 As such, Lesson 9
would serve to undermine their ability to provide moral and religious
training to their children according to their own beliefs.' When their
request to be excused from Lesson 9 was denied, they petitioned the Al-
ameda Superior Court to issue a writ of mandamus to require the school
district to excuse their children from it.' 9 The Court denied their
petition in December 2009. 'o Interestingly, unlike the plaintiffs in Par-
ker and Montgomery County Public School, these plaintiffs have not yet
claimed violations of their rights under the Constitution. This Article
now moves on to argue that Lesson 9 is constitutional on its face, and
that any claim to the contrary should be dismissed by the court.
C Lesson 9 Does Not Violate the First Amendment Clauses
Lesson 9 does not violate any of the parents' or their children's First
Amendment rights. It does not violate the parents'I or their children's
free exercise rights, because the proposed course materials and instruc-
tions to teachers do not indicate an attempt to coerce anyone." Given
that the free exercise of religion means "the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires," the parents must show the co-
ercive effect of Lesson 9 as it operates against them and their children in
the practice of their religion.' There is no "coercion" in the form of a
direct interference with parents' or their children's religious beliefs, nor
of "compulsion" in the form of punishment for their beliefs. 66' As the
curriculum shows, teachers merely instruct their children about diverse
families, bullying and stereotypes, and the proposed classroom activities
revolve around group discussions. 6Thus, aionasuet nyhv
to attend lessons, but do not have to participate silently in a group ritu-
al, like the students in Weisman had to remain in respectful silence while
157. Brief for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 4.
158. Id
159. Id. at 5-6.
160. Balde v. Alameda Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-468037 (Super. Ct. Cal. Alameda Cnty.
Dec. 1, 2009).
161. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 105 (1st Cit. 2008).
162. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 103.
163. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
164. See Brief (Amended) for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 1-29 (Exhibit 1).
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the rabbi recited the prayer at the school ceremony.6 6' Because Lesson 9 is
not coercive, the free exercise rights of the parents and their children are
not violated.1
6 6
Likewise, Lesson 9 does not implicate the free exercise rights of the
California parents and their children because it does nor indicate "ex-
treme indoctrination," which the First Circuit in Parker assumed, in the
plaintiffs' favor, to be a form of "coercion."'16 7 All sessions under Lesson 9
run only once a year, each lasting no longer than two hours. As a result,
students are not continuously exposed to allegedly offensive ideas.6 6' As
in Parker, the mere fact that the children in California are exposed once
a year to ideas contrary to their beliefs and values would not inhibit
their parents, who have had notice of the books and the school's intent
to promote tolerance and safety, from instructing their children differ-
ently.169 In addition, unlike the teacher in Roberts, who indoctrinated
students by continuously exposing them to religious storybooks and the
religious poster, Lesson 9 does not prefer any particular religion or life-
style over others. 10Even presuming a real attempt to indoctrinate, the
Alameda Unified School District's intent behind Lesson 9 could only be
to indoctrinate students with "respect and tolerance for every type of
family," attitudes that can be learned by the children regardless of their
age. 17'Hence, should there really be an "indoctrination test" in a free
exercise claim, Lesson 9 wouild easily pass the rest.
Along the same line, Lesson 9 does not violate the Establishment
Clause because it passes every prong of the Lemon test.7 7' First, entitled
"Safe School Communityl Curriculum-Lesson 9," or "Caring School
Community Supplement, Lesson 9," it has a clear, secular purpose of
building up a safe, caring and supportive school environment.17 1 Second,
even presuming that the purpose of Lesson 9 cannot be established solely
from its title, Lesson 9 does not include any religious texts, and teachers'
instructions focus solely upon instructing about different family struc-
tures and the negative effects of stereotypes and bullying, without
165. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593, 595 (1992).
166. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 103, 105.
167. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 105.
168. See Brief (Amended) for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 5, 9, 13, 17, 23 (Ex-
hibit 1); Brief for Petitioners- Plai ntiffs, supra note 3, at 65 (Exhibit 1).
169. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 106.
170. See Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1049 (10th Cir. 1990); Brief (Amended) for
Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 1-19 (Exhibit 1).
171. See Chamberlain v. Surrey Sch. Dist. No. 36, (2003) 221 D.L.R. 4th 56, para. 69
(Can.).
172. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
173. See Brief (Amended) for Petitioners-Plain tiffs, supra note 3, at 3-4; Brief for Petition-
ers-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 4.
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making any mention of religion)'74 Thus, Lesson Y/s principal and prima-
ry effect neither advances nor inhibits religion.7 7' The curriculum,
therefore, does not foster an "excessive entanglement with religion."1
7
1
Because Lesson 9 has no trouble passing the Lemon test and is facially
neutral, strict scrutiny review does not even apply.1
7 7
Finally, Lesson 9 does not violate the Free Speech Clause, under
which the government may regulate the content of public school in-
structions, provided that such regulations are reasonable and viewpoint
neutral. 7 7' Regulating the California public school curriculum to pro-
mote "safety and tolerance" of GLBT people and alternative families
would be reasonable. Moreover, Lesson 5/s instructions to teachers grant
them much latitude in delivering the lessons, and group discussions
among students play an important parr in the learning process. 19It
therefore does not endorse certain viewpoints to the exclusion of oth-
ers. 10As such, it is different from the Revised Curriculum in
Montgomery County Public Schools, which discriminated against certain
religious sects and which stated that materials are to be presented to stu-
dents as facts and teachers could not provide any form of supplement."
Hence, state regulation of school curriculum through Lesson 9, being
both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, does not implicate the Free
Speech Clause.8
D. Lesson 9 and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
Following Parker, which in turn relied upon Blau, Meyer and Pierce,
it is clear that Lesson 9 does not violate parents' due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment, even without subjecting it to its applicable
standard of review.' Although the Supreme Court has recognized a sub-
stantive due process right of parents to make decisions concerning the
education of their children, it has not recognized parents' right to direct
174. See id. at 1-29 (Exhibit 1).
175. See id
176. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; see id.
177. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); Citizens for a Responsible Curricu-
lum v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Scb., No. 05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634, at *10 (D.
Md. May 5, 2005).
178. See Montgomery Crny. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at *11.
179. See Brief (Amended) for Petitioners-Plain tiffs, supra note 1, 1-29 (Exhibit 1).
180. See id.
181. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WI 1075634, at *4-5 * 12.
182. See Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 1075634, at * 11-12.
183. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 101-02 (1 st Cit. 2008).
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how public schools teach their children.' California, therefore, retains
full control over designing its gay-friendly curriculum to promote a safe
and tolerant school environment.' Moreover, since there has been no
federal case under the Due Process Clause which permits parents to de-
mand an exemption for their children from exposure to certain books
used in public schools, the parents probably would not be able to ex-
empt their children from Lesson 9.11 Nevertheless, because Lesson 9 is a
California public elementary school curriculum, to examine whether it
violates the Due Process Clause, it is helpful to look at Fields v. Palmdale
School District, a recent Ninth Circuit opinion, which articulates both
narrow and broad "legitimate education objectives" under the Constitu-
tion.
1. Fields v. Palmdale School District and
"Legitimate Educational Objective"
In Fields, the plaintiffs' children were questioned in their public el-
ementary school about sexual topics in a psychological assessment survey
with the announced goal of "establish [ing] a community baseline meas-
ure of children's exposure to early trauma (for example, violence) ."8
The plaintiffs brought a due process claim against the Palmdale School
District and two of its officials for violating their right to privacy to
make intimate familial decisions and their right to control the upbring-
ing of their children by introducing them to matters of and relating to
sex in accordance with their personal and religious values and beliefs.1
8
1
Like the court in Parker, the Ninth Circuit held that the liberty interest
in the custody and care of children does not reside exclusively in their
parents, nor is it beyond regulation by the state.' Therefore, the plain-
tiffs had no due process or privacy right to override the determinations
of public schools regarding the information to which their children
would be exposed.'O In addition, neither their fundamental right to di-
rect the upbringing and education of their children, nor their privacy
right, encompassed the right to introduce them to sexual topics in ac-
cordance with their values and beliefs.' 9'
184. Parker, 514 F.3d at 101-02.
185. Parker, 514 F.3d at 101-02.
186. Parker, 514 F.3d at 102.
187. Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005).
188. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1202.
189. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1204.
190. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1200, 1205-07.
191. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1205-06, 1208.
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The Fields court, unlike the Parker court, did not merely circum-
scribe the parents' right concerning their children's education before
dismissing the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim. 1 12 Unlike the
plaintiffs in Parker, the plaintiffs in Fields did not believe that the survey
served any legitimate state interest. 913 The Ninth Circuit therefore went
a step further by subjecting the survey to the applicable standard of re-
view. Since the survey did not infringe the parents' fundamental right
and did nor involve suspect classifications, the rational basis test
applied.' The Court then rejected the plaintiffs' two arguments against
the rational basis review."
First, the Ninth Circuit responded to the plaintiffs' claim that the
defendants' survey could not pass the rational basis test because there
was no legitimate governmental purpose to the survey and it was under-
taken in order to benefit the academic career of one of the officials. 9
The court found this argument to be speculative and conclusory, be-
cause there was detailed information setting forth the survey's legitimate
governmental purposes and explaining with specificity how the infor-
mation obtained would be used for education purposes.17
The Ninth Circuit's response to the plaintiffs' second argument,
namely, that the survey was not a part of the school's curriculum, served
to clarify the scope of "legitimate state interest" in the rational basis
test. 98 Its approach was different from that adopted by the First Circuit.
While the Parker court did not use the rational basis test to dismiss the
plaintiffs' due process claim, it described briefly how it would have ap-
plied to the case, stating that it would have relied heavily upon existing
state law to define the scope of "legitimate state interest," in that case,
legitimate educational objectives of Massachusetts. 99 It reasoned that,
because Massachusetts recognized gay marriage under its state constitu-
tion, it would be "entirely rational for its schools to educate their
students regarding that recognition" by teaching storybooks like King
and King that endorse gay marriage.2 00 The court implied that if Massa-
chusetts had not recognized gay marriage, then it might not be rational
192. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1208-11.
193. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1203.
194. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1208.
195. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1208-11.
196. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1208-09.
197. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209.
198. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209-11.
199. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 94-95 (1 st Cit. 2008).
200. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 95.
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for schools to educate their students about gay marriage through the
curriculum.''
The Ninth Circuit, however, articulated a broader "legitimate state
interest" and its educational objective and did not reference state law in
its discussion. 22Responding to the plaintiffs' second argument that the
survey was not a part of the school curriculum and therefore cannot pass
rational basis review, the court stated that their contention "1construe[d]
too narrowly the aims of education and fails to recognize the unique role
that it plays in American society. ,2'Tecut then cited the Supreme
Court's unanimous holding in Brown v. Board of Education as a remind-
er of the governmentIs "compelling interest in the broad ends of educa-
education."O In Brown, the Court stressed that education is important
to a democratic society, being "the very foundation of good citizenship"
and "a principal instrument" in helping a child, among other things, to
"cadjust normally to his environment. 2 0 ' Thus, the Ninth Circuit clari-
fied that the "broad ends of education" serve "higher civic and social
functions, including the rearing of children into healthy, productive,
and responsible adults and the cultivation of talented and qualified lead-
ers of diverse backgrounds. " 0 ' Because the defendants had prepared the
psychological survey with the aim of protecting the mental health of
children and facilitating their education, the survey fulfilled a "legiti-
mate educational objective" and fell squarely within the state's "broad
interest in education. "20 ' As the Ninth Circuit made no reference to state
law, such a "broad interest in education" is by no means confined to
what are designated by existing law.20
To gauge whether Lesson 9 passes rational teview, one can follow
the narrow definition by looking to California law on gay marriage and
domestic partnership as well as its education reform. In addition, the
Fields court's broader view of a "legitimate educational objective" can be
used to confirm the argument that Lesson 9 is constitutional, and to
draw inferences on what materials can be legitimately used in a gay-
friendly curriculum in California public schools. 0 9
201. See Parker, 514 F.3d at 95.
202. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209.
203. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209.
204. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209.
205. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
206. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209.
207. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209-10.
208. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209-10.
209. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209-11.
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2. California's Unique History of Marriage Law and
Education Reform
Pursuant to California Family Code Section 297.5, enacted in
1999, domestic partners in California "1shall have the same rights, pro-
tections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities,
obligations, and duties under law . .. "as married spouses .2 On May
15, 2008, the California Supreme Court struck down the limitation on
marriage to "between a man and a woman" 21 1 in In re Marriage Cases,
holding that the California Constitution guarantees to all people the
fundamental right to marry regardless of their sexual orientation .2 ,2 One
month later, county clerks in California started to issue marriage licenses
to same-sex couples 1  while conservative and religious-afiliated groups
began to denounce the court's decision,"' 4 leading to Proposition 8,
which stated that "[o~nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid
or recognized in California" and which was approved by voters on No-
211vember 4, 2008 . On the following day, California stopped issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples .216 The 18,000 same-sex marriages
granted by California from June 16 to November 4, 2008, as well as by
other jurisdictions before the end of this period, remain legally recog-
nized and retain full state-level marriage rights .21" However, same-sex
couples who intended to get married after this period could only enter
into domestic partnerships. 1 On August 4, 2010, the district court's
held that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional because it discriminated
against gay men and women, and one would expect this legal battle to
continue until it is settled by the Supreme Court. 1
California's Comprehensive Health Education Programs offered in
kindergarten and grades one through twelve were designed to ensure
that public school students receive instructions in matters of personal,
210. CAL. F~m. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2009).
211. CAL. F~m. CODE §§ 300(a), 308.5 (West 2009).
212. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
213. Richard Salas, In Re Marriage Cases: The Fundamental Right to Marry and Equal
Protection Under the California Constitution and the Effects of Proposition 8, 36 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 545 (2009).
214. Clay Rehrig, California Bans Gay Marriage by Simple Majority Vote, 14 PUB. INT. L.
REP. 152, 153 (2009).
215. Salas, supra note 213, at 559, 559-60.
216. Salas, supra note 213, at 546.
217. John Schwartz, California High Court Upholds Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May
27, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/27marriage.htmI.
218. Id.
219. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51890(a)(1) (West 2009).
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family, and community health.120 The California State Board of Educa-
tion adopted Health Education Content Standards for California Public
Schoolt, Kindergarten Through Grade Twelve on March 12, 2008, which
includes minimum recommended grade-level assignments for six con-
tent areas, ranging from growth and development, to mental, emotional,
and social health .2 2 ' Kindergarten students learn how people are similar
and different, and how to recognize the characteristics of bullying 2 2 2 and
how to describe the characteristics of families. 2 ' Themes of family and
individual differences continue to run through the curriculum from
grade one through five. First-graders study the various roles, responsibil-
ities and needs of family members 2 4 and second-graders learn to respect
individual differences.21 W ietrd-graders learn healthy social behav-
ior to promote a positive school environment, 2 fourth-graders study
different types of bullying and harassment and their effects upon other
people, and how courtesy, compassion, and respect reduce conflicts. 2  In
grade five, students learn to appreciate individual differences in physical
appearance and gender roles. 2
Senator Sheila Kuehl introduced Senate Bill 1437 on February 2,
2006 to enlarge provisions in Education Code §§ 51500, 51501, and
60044, so that instructional materials containing matters that "reflect
adversely" upon people because of their sexual orientation would be
prohibited . On September 6, 2006, the Governor vetoed the bill on
the grounds that it attempted to offer vague protection and that Educa-
tion Code %§ 200, 220 and 60044 and Penal Code § 422.55 already
provided clear protection against discrimination based upon sexual oi
entation .2 Kuehl introduced Senate Bill 777 on February 23, 2007,
220. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., HEALTH EDUC. AND CONTENT STANDARDS FOR CAL. PUB.
SCH., KINDERGARTEN THROUGH GRADE TWELVE, http://www.cde.ca.gov/BE/ST/
SS/documents/healrhstandrnar08.pdf.
221. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 220, at 2, 4.
222. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., SUPra note 220, at 2.
223. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 220, at 4.
224. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUc., supra note 220, at 13.
225. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 220, at 14-15.
226. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 220, at 19-20.
227. CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 220, at 25.
228. S.B. 1437, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006), mwted by Governor Sehwarzenegger on Sept. 6,
2006, in OFFCIAL CALIFORNIA LEGisI.ATtvE INFORMATION, htrp://ww.leginfo.cagov/pub/05-
06/billsenlsb 1401-1450/sb 1437 bill 20060222 introduced.htrnlA.
229. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegge's Veto Message, Official California Legislative Information
(Sept. 6, 2006), inl OFFICIAL CALIFORNIA LEGisLATWvE INFORmATION, available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bil/sen/sb 1401-I 4501sb1437_yt_20060906.html.
230. See S.B. 777, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007), available at http://www.leginfo.eagov/pub/07-
08/bill/sen/sb 075 1-0800/sb-777- bil20070223-introdue~html .
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revising the prohibited bases of discrimination in §§ 200, 220, 51500,
51501 and 60044 by more directly referencing the definition of hate
crimes contained in Penal Code § 42255 . On October 12, 2007, this
bill was approved by the Governor and signed into law.232 Thus, teaching
materials that "adversely reflect" upon people because of their sexual
orientation is now prohibited .
3. Lesson 9's Rational Relation to California
Law and Education Objectives
Lesson 9's purported overall objective to promote "safety and toler-
ance" in school settings is no doubt rationally related to California law
on public school education in general. 3  More specifically, given that
kindergarten children should learn about the characteristics of families
under California law, K-3 grades objectives to teach students to "identify
what makes a family," "identify and describe a variety of families" and
"understand that families have some similarities and some differences"
are all rationally related to this goal . Similarly, California's educational
policy stipulates that students in grades one to three continue learn
about different families and respect for individual differences. 3  Thus, it
is entirely rational for Lesson 9 to make use of books similar to WhoM in a
Family, Thats a Family, and And Tango Makes Three from grade one to
three to instruct students about gay and lesbian parents and the shared
attributes of healthy families. 3
Lesson 9's fourth and fifth grade lesson objectives also comply with
California law on education. 3 8 Its grade four lesson objectives of "devel-
oping empathy and being an ally" serve to advance the official
educational goal of teaching different types of bullying and harassment,
and how compassion and respect reduce conflicts. 3 ' The fifth grade les-
son objective to discuss the harmful effects of stereotyping GLBT
people, particularly its use of a list of famous gay and lesbian people, is
231. S. B. 777, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess& (Cal. 2007) (enacted), available at http://info.sen.ca~gov/pub/07-
08/billlsenlsb-075 1-0800/sb -777--bil20071012 chatered.html.
232. See 2007 Cal. Star. ch. 569 (S.B. 777).
233. See Brief (Amended) for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 4; CA&L. EDUC. CODE
§ 51890(a)(1)(B)(D).
234. See Brief for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 4; EDUC. § 51890(a)(1)(B)(D).
235. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51890(a)(1)(B)(D) (West 2009).
236. See Brief (Amended) for Petitio ners-Plai ntiffs, supra note 3, at 5-14 (Exhibit 1).
237. See CAL. EUcCCODE § 51 890(a)(1)(B)(D).
238. See Brief (Amended) for Petitioners- Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 17 (Exhibit 1).
239. See 2007 Cal. Stat. cb. 569 (S.B. 777); Brief (Amended) for Peti tione rs-Plai ntiffs,
supra note 3, at 23, 25-29 (Exhibit 1).
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rationally related to Senate Bill 777, now signed into law, which prohib-
its teaching materials that "adversely reflect" upon people because of
their sexual orientation. 4
If the court articulates California's legitimate educational objective
with reference to its current law on marriage, then Lesson 9 would serve
a legitimate educational interest by educating children regarding Cali-
fornia's recognition of domestic partnership, but does not say anything
at all about gay marriage .2 Lesson 9 instructs teachers to teach words
like "caretaker" and "couple" to second-graders, and terms like "adoptive
parents," "adopted children," "two moms" and "two dads" to third-




While Who's in a Family and And Tango Makes Three portray diverse
families, and And Tango Makes Three even portrays a gay couple, they
neither mention nor endorse gay marriage . 4 ' Teaching about alternative




After the overturning of Proposition 8, same-sex marriage may be legal-
ized again in the future. Because Lesson 9 would serve a legitimate
interest when gay marriage is outlawed, it would no doubt serve a legit-
imate interest and be constitutional if gay marriage is made legal again.
4. Lesson 9's Rational Relation to California's
"Broad Ends of Education"
Lesson 9, which complies with California law on marriage and edu-
cation, also serves the "broad ends of education" identified by the Ninth
Circuit in Fields .24 ' The Field court, citing language from the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown, described education as "a principal instru-
ment" in helping a child to "adjust normally to his environment. 2 6
Teaching children about diverse families, as well as the harms of name-
calling and stereotyping, serves the "higher civic social functions" of
"rearing of children into healthy, productive, and responsible adults and
240. See Brief (Amended) for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 5, 9-11.
241. See Brief (Amended) for Petitioners- Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 9, 12 (Exhibit 1).
242. See PETER PARNELL & JUSTIN RICHARDSON, AND TANGO MAKES THREE (Simon &
Schuster Children's Publ'g 2005); ROBERT SKUTCH & LA~URA LINHAUS, WHO'S IN A
FAMILY? (Tricycle Press 2004).
243. See Brief (Amended) for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, supra note 3, at 5, 9-11.
244. See Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1209 (9th Cit. 2005).
245. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 493 (1954)).
246. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
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the cultivation of talented and qualified leaders of diverse back-
grounds. ,1
Interestingly, Lesson 9 does not include King and King, one of the
disputed texts in Parker, which is more controversial than Who's in a
Family and And Tango Makes Three in that it portrays the marriage of
two princes. Before the overturning of Proposition 8, even including
this book would not make Lesson 9 unconstitutional. Gay marriage was
legalized for a five-month period in 2007, during which many gay cou-
ples got married and are still living in the state." At least so me of the
couples who got married in the brief five-month period will have chil-
dren attending public elementary schools in the near future .2 ' Teaching
King and King, or storybooks that more explicitly endorse gay marriage,
will both enhance the stated objective of the curriculum by promoting
safety and tolerance in school settings, and serve a "higher civic func-
tion" by helping young children to learn about and adjust to the
Californian society.5 If same-sex marriage is made legal again in Cali-
fornia, Lesson 9, be it inclusive of storybooks of King and King or not,
will be constitutional in California.
IV. GAY-FRIENDLY CURRICULUM IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS:
TANGO OR MORE?
Ideally, children should learn to embrace diversity at a young age,
and a gay-positive curriculum can properly be used to teach them about
different types of family structures not only in their home states but also
in other states. 25' Courts nonetheless look to state legislatures to deter-
mine whether the use of certain gay-friendly materials is
constitutional .2 2 There is no doubt that in states that have legalized gay
marriage, including nor only Massachusetts but also Connecticut, Iowa,
New Hampshire, Vermont, and Washington, D.C., teaching a gay-
friendly curriculum, even using King and King, will not violate the Con-
stitution .2 3 In all other states, a gay-friendly curriculum like Lesson 9,
aimed at promoting safety and tolerance, will also be constitutional,
provided that the state constitution does not limit the teaching of gay-
247. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209.
248. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 217.
249. See, eg, id
250. See Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209.
251. See, e.g. LIPKIN, supra note 8.
252. See, e.g.,I Parker v. H-urley, 514 F.3d 87, 95 (1 st Cit. 2008).
253. ESKRIDGE, JR. & HUNTER, supra note 132, at 135-37.
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friendly curriculum."' 4 Storybooks like King and King, which portray
same-sex marriages, will remain highly controversial and could raise a
due process claim on the grounds that they serve neither a narrowly de-
fined legitimate state interest, nor a broad educational objective, in
states that do not allow gay marriage."
The study of the constitutionality of Lesson 9 also carries implica-
tions for the repeal of the Maine law that allowed for same-sex marriage
and the public school curriculum in Maine. Before Maine voters re-
pealed the law on November 4, 2009, opponents of same-sex marriage
expressed their fear about "immoral gay-marriage lectures" in public
schools. 5 Maine's Attorney General, as well as the campaigners who
defended gay marriage, countered that Maine's state curriculum guide-
lines contain no reference to marriage and that such fear was
"baseless. 25 " However, even if the law had not been repealed, introduc-
ing children to same-sex marriage in a family and health education
curriculum would have fallen squarely within the legitimate educational
objectives of the state .25 ' The repeal of the law, on the other hand, gives
the Maine conservatives a strong reason not to mention same-sex mar-
riage in its public school curriculum. 5
CONCLUSION
Introducing a gay-friendly curriculum in public elementary schools
creates a conflict of rights between parents who desire to control the up-
bringing of their children and state governments with a gay-friendly
orientation desiring to educate children according to their educational
objectives and pu blic interests. This Article has shown that Lesson 9 does
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause or any part
of the First Amendment. Exposing young children to alternative families
might cause them temporary confusion. Yet, a gay-positive curriculum
like Lesson 9 does not impose any constitutionally significant burden on
254. See, e.g., Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209.
255. See, e.g., Fields, 427 F.3d at 1209.
256. See, e.g., Posting of Ryan to Eagleionline.com, Professor Fitzgibbon Featured in Maine
Campaign Ad, (Sept. 15, 2009), http://eagleionline.com/2009/09/1 5/professor-
firzgibbon-featured-in-maine-ad-campaign/.
257. See, e.g. Press Release, Office of the Maine Attorney General, Attorney General Mills
Issues Opinion on the Implications of LD 1020 on Maine School Curricula, (Oct.
15, 2009), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic-
AGO fflePress&id= 8 2932 &v= article.
258. See, e.g., Parker, 514 F.3d at 95.
259. See, e.g., Parker, 514 F.3d at 95.
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the rights of children and their parents, and is a good way to promote
safety and tolerance at schools and to help children learn about their
complex, diverse society. t
